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Edwards: Preparing Today for the Mines of Tomorrow

PREPARING TODAY
FOR THE MINES OF TOMORROW
Joshua Edwards

T

o the inquiry, “What simple initial threat do I need to blockade a port with
mines?,” various responses present themselves. Simple initial threat is basically the probability that the first vessel to attempt transiting the minefield will
become a casualty, so that it no longer can perform its mission. The simple initial
threat might be very low because the enemy is not very determined to overcome
the minefield; it might be very high because the enemy is very determined to
do so. An enemy with a strong mine countermeasure presence or one willing to
accept a high degree of risk simply might channelize through the minefield and
accept whatever attrition occurs, making simple initial threat a useless measure
of effectiveness (MOE) for blockading. The question asked above seeks to determine what conditions determine the simple initial threat from mines that would
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rooted in human psychology. MOEs currently in use are informative but do not
answer the question of the level of risk that mines need to create to achieve a particular goal, such as closing a port. This article adapts methodologies developed
for land mines/obstacles to maritime mining, owing to their inherent similarity;
aligns MOEs to operational objectives; explores developmental mining concepts;
and presents new MOEs for maritime mines.
Maritime mines generally will not win a war by themselves; however, they
have the potential to change the outcome of a war by complementing other
platforms and weapon systems. Incorporating mines to complement submarine,
surface, air, land, and special forces can increase force effectiveness exponentially.
In that regard, commanders should understand clearly how maritime mining effects can be used to increase the capability of the fleet and to dictate operational
maneuvers and efficiency of movement. History has demonstrated that mines
are a strategic weapon that can inflict physical and psychological damage that
impacts the military, economic, and political wellness of an enemy sufficiently to
change the course of a war.
Physical damage, such as the sinking of a ship or damaging of it to the point
where it aborts its mission, is often the grading scale associated with the MOE of
a minefield. However, other grading scales do not depend on physical damage. If
the intent is to create a barrier and the declared minefield affects enemy movement, the field has merit. The mine is not the primary weapon; it is a subset of the
primary weapon—the minefield itself. History provides examples of minefields
being very successful despite augmentation by decoy mines, or even being made
up entirely of decoy mines, or simply being declared fields without any weapons
in them at all. The last case, especially, shows us that a minefield’s greatest threat
is not to enemy shipping but to the enemy psyche. Greer and Bartholomew point
out that “the real effect of a minefield derives from a subtler influence—an exaggerated fear.”2 However, a “brittle” minefield can be pierced easily by countermeasures and then might collapse, negating the intended effect. It is important that
the enemy experience a robust minefield capability that is replicable if we are to
capitalize on that exaggerated fear—a fear that may be strong enough to allow
a minefield without mines to be durable over time. This article starts from the
original question, reviews the concepts currently in doctrine, and offers ideas on
how to extend beyond them.
A BRIEF HISTORY
The lessons the Russians learned during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War
about the impact of both defensive and offensive mining were not lost on the
participants in the two world wars.3 Russian mines were more effective against
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Japanese battleships than the Russian fleet was. However, as noted, the fear of a
minefield can have effects beyond the sinking of ships.
During the First World War, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, France, and
Great Britain lost 240 submarines, with mines or mine-nets causing sixty-eight
of those losses. Germany lost thirty-eight U-boats to these causes, with the Dover
Barrage (a minefield aimed at denying German submarines access to the English
Channel) claiming sixteen of them in the last year of the war. While the loss of
sixteen submarines is significant, the real power was in the strategic value: the
barrage forced the U-boats to take a much longer route to begin their operations,
which had critical effects on the submarine population and the boats’ time in an
operating area. While the Germans focused on the tactical aspects of mine warfare, sinking more than one million tons of Allied merchant shipping, the Allies
understood the strategic value of mine warfare.4 At Gallipoli the Allied powers,
despite having a clear advantage in overall military capability, learned how devastating a minefield supported by gunfire can be. The combined threat caused
the Allies to pause when they should have pressed forward, and this inaction by
Allied commanders caused their mission to fail.5
Mines also played a major role in the Second World War, for both Allied and
Axis powers, with mines used to achieve strategic effects.6 For example, while
some criticize the Northern Mine Barrage (defensive minefields designed to
restrict German access to the Atlantic Ocean) for a lack of kills (although some
kills may have gone unnoticed and uncredited), the mine barrage is what caused
Bismarck to be detected, which eventually led to its sinking in May 1941.7 In the
Pacific, mining in Palau trapped thirty-two Japanese ships in port, providing a
target-rich environment; Allied aircraft sank twenty-three ships and damaged the
remainder with bombs and torpedoes in March 1944. Mining also contributed
to the sinking of ships by forcing vessels away from mined coastlines, which allowed radar to direct aircraft for attacks in the open ocean. The Japanese navy
responded to maritime mining by abandoning anchorages at Palau, Penang, and
Kavieng in the western Pacific area. Ground forces also benefited from naval
mining because disruptions in supply caused problems for the Japanese army in
China, Burma, Siam, Malaya, and Indochina.8
Contrary to popular belief, both world wars brought the fight to the shores
of the United States, and maritime mines played a huge role in submarine shore
defense, which kept supply ports open and ensured that major military and
industrial complexes remained operational in support of the war effort. The
National Park Service notes that in the defense of San Francisco Bay, “[i]f the big
guns failed to stop an enemy vessel far offshore, the next line of defense was three
minefields.”9 Later, in Vietnam, the mining of Haiphong Harbor in 1972 did what
bombers alone had seemed unable to do: impose coercive diplomacy. Maritime
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Summer2019Review.indb 42

3

5/2/19 11:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 5

E D WA R D S

43

mines closed the port, which forced supply lines to go overland, making the
bombing campaign incredibly effective against trucks and trains. Because of the
lack of supply routes, the North Vietnamese offense stalled; in fact, the North
Vietnamese were unable to initiate any major offensive campaigns. This effect
is credited widely to the maritime mines that prevented the resupply of their
forces. Thus, maritime mines were the major factor in bringing North Vietnam
to the negotiating table and in the release of American prisoners of war. One has
to wonder what the outcome of the war would have been had suggestions from
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), for the
mining of major ports not been ignored earlier in the war.10
As referred to above, the value of a mine often is in its second-order effects.
Mines have limited U-boats’ time on station, facilitated the sinking of enemy
ships by aircraft, caused ports to be abandoned, made land campaigns difficult
by choking replenishment, and kept harbors safe, and have been the weapon of
choice for coercive diplomacy. A minefield is completely capable of achieving
its objective through the attrition of enemy vessels that transit the minefield, or
through fear of the minefield, which may cause enemy forces to avoid potential
losses, including by leaving their ships in port. Furthermore, the mere capability
to mine effectively may be enough to cause enemy forces to choose not to challenge a declared minefield that may have no actual mines.
Commanders must decide what type of minefields to use to obtain their
operational objective. Captain Wayne P. Hughes, USN (Ret.), of the Naval Postgraduate School points out that mines can act both to attack enemy commerce
and to defend our own commerce, particularly in antisubmarine warfare, in a
number of ways.
1.	 “Ensure safety of goods and services: navies protect the movement of
shipping and means of war on the oceans and safeguard stationary forces,
to include nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and
coastal patrols.”
2.	 “Deny safety of enemy goods and services: navies prevent the movement
of enemy shipping and means of war and threaten enemy forces, such as
SSBNs.”11
DEFINING THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
In many regards, the principles of maritime mining are similar to those governing the use of obstacles, barriers, and mines in land warfare. Objectives such as
disrupt, fix, turn, and block are pursued both on land and at sea. However, current Navy doctrine chooses to provide specific effects rather than leverage sets of
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effects for communication. For example, Navy mine policy specifies that mines
be usable to “deny the enemy the ability to carry out amphibious operations, or
in support of friendly amphibious operations, or to destroy enemy ships and
submarines directly.”12
The different policy descriptions can be harmonized, however; by incorporating specific effects within sets of effect terms (such as block, fix, turn, or disrupt),
the planner gains a clearer understanding of how to achieve the specific policy.
Yet while recognizing the numerous technical distinctions between naval and
land warfare, the Navy might benefit from treating specific effects as subsets
within sets of effects. This matter of deciding how to join sets and subsets may
seem like a chicken-and-egg discussion; the key point is to have a method that
describes the objectives sufficiently for commanders and their staffs to go beyond
consideration of specific examples of maritime mining to incorporate maritime
mining within operational art. For example, a minefield established with the
intent to harass, deter, or send a political message would fall under the disrupt
objective, while the intent to cause a delay long enough to allow delivery of a
strike package could fall under the fix objective.
To derive the definitions used here for operational objectives, I extended those
found in Marine Corps doctrine to focus more on maritime mining.13 Conceptual examples follow the definitions, with historical references provided to clarify
interpretations of those definitions. Concepts also are derived from Barriers,
Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-15.14 The
examples discussed below do not cover the full range of intent, but rather provide
a framework for how to categorize intent.
Disrupt
Definition. When a minefield is used to alter enemy formations and tempo, interrupt enemy timetables, cause the enemy to begin mine countermeasures (MCM)
operations, or some combination thereof.
Conceptual Examples. (1) A defensive field that causes enemy formations to
channelize through the field, to where hunters wait for them on the other side.
(2) An offensive field designed to delay the resupplying of enemy ports.
Historical Example. During World War II, the maritime mining of Siamese (Thai)
waters by the United States disrupted Japanese supply chains anywhere from a day
to a month, which degraded the supply line for the Japanese army.15
Fix
Definition. When a minefield is designed to slow or stop targets to create a
target-rich environment for friendly forces in an engagement area. Ideally, this
field would inhibit the enemy’s capability to defend itself against friendly forces.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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Conceptual Example. Mining a port to delay the departure of targets of interest,
with the intention of sending in an air strike.
Historical Example. During World War II, thirty-two Japanese ships were trapped
in port at Palau, providing a target-rich environment for Allied aircraft attacking
with bombs and torpedoes.16
Turn
Definition. When a minefield is intended to divert enemy formations from their
intended transit onto one that is advantageous to friendly units.
Conceptual Examples. (1) Turning enemy forces toward an engagement. (2)
Turning enemy forces so as to increase the length of their transit routes, thereby
preventing them from having adequate time in an operational area.
Historical Example. During World War I, the Dover Barrage forced U-boats to
travel around a minefield, which reduced their time in their operational areas,
and therefore their ability to interfere with Allied vessels.17
Block
Definition. When a minefield is emplaced to stop maritime traffic along a specific avenue of approach. Blocking minefields should be able to withstand enemy
MCM techniques, including clearance through attrition, using creativity, technology, mine density, or some combination thereof to overcome enemy efforts.
While all minefields can be integrated with joint/integrated fires, blocking minefields benefit the most.
Conceptual Examples. (1) An offensive minefield whose purpose is to close an
enemy port for some duration of time. (2) A defensive field that is used to prevent
an amphibious landing by the enemy.
Historical Example. The mining of Haiphong Harbor during the Vietnam War
stopped all shipping even before the minefield was actually live. Sea traffic did
not resume until after the U.S. Navy cleared the minefield.18
The maritime mining terminology currently in use provides the general location
of a minefield. Offensive minefields are located within twelve nautical miles of the
enemy’s coastline. Protective minefields are located within twelve nautical miles
of a friendly coastline. Defensive minefields are located more than twelve nautical
miles from land.
PREPARING TO MEET REQUIREMENTS
FOR OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
What impact on the target must be accomplished to meet the commander’s intent? Three levels of damage frame intent: mobility kill, mission abort, and destroy.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/5
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Mobility kill constitutes damaging the target so that it loses the ability to control
speed and heading. Mission abort is defined as damaging the target such that it
is not capable of exercising some set of predefined capabilities. Destroy means to
damage a target so that it sinks.
Begin by assuming that the number of mines in a field may vary on the basis
of the level of damage required. (This is not the rule itself, but a framework for
conveying the concept.) Hold weapon, target, and conditions constant. In this
conceptual scenario, a planner would need x number of mines for mission abort,
but may need x − k mines to achieve mobility kill and x + k mines to destroy.
Why does this matter? If the commander intends to block a port with an offensive minefield that is not in any of the engagement areas, planners could elect
to design fields to cause mobility kills that will prevent adversary vessels from
reaching their patrol or engagement areas. Saving the k mines thus not needed
(given that k might represent only one mine—or a hundred) may reduce the
risk to delivery platforms, or reduce the number of weapons required to meet
the MOE, or both. In another situation, a defensive field might be designed to
disrupt within an engagement area, with the planner choosing to aim at destroy or mission abort to achieve the commander’s intent. Simply put, planners
should have the capability to match a desired level of damage to the operational
objective.
Minefield planning relies on understanding weapon-to-target matching, yet it
maintains some characteristics of an art, in that it must account for the psychological perspectives of those subjected to the mining; both aspects will dictate the
planner’s course of action. Commanders and planners must remember that the
psychological aspect of mine warfare is often its greatest strength; therefore they
should exploit the fears of the enemy creatively. However, planners should start
from some core ideas, on which they can expand as needed. I offer the definitions
of key terms below as such a starting point. (They assume the capability to plan
and deliver precision-placed mines.)
• Mine group: A set of mines placed to provide a layer of threat to a target. The
mine group need not be linear. The advent of precision-placed mines will
provide planners the ability to plan randomly, semirandomly, linearly, or
with optimized precision. Planners can create all types of patterns, although
for ease of illustration this article uses mine groups with linear patterns.
• Mine segment: A collection of mines that are associated with each other
according to conditions that impact performance. Mine segments can exist
within a mine group or can consist of one or more mine groups. Figure 1
provides an example of multiple mine groups making up a mine segment,
while figure 2 provides an example of a mine group that is segmented.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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• Minefield: A composition of one or more mine segments that are implemented to achieve a specific operational objective. Minefields and segments are
planned to meet an appropriate measure of effectiveness. Multiple minefields
might be required to achieve the operational objective.
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Figure 3
FIGURE 3
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• Layered minefield: The design of a single or multiple minefields where the
target is expected to pass through more than one mine segment or minefield.
The purpose is to understand the cumulative threat to the target.
• Minefield set. A group of minefields used to achieve an operational objective
in a specific area.
• Mine danger zone: An area that is declared—in accordance with the Hague
Convention of 1907—to alert vessels that the designated area might contain
maritime mines and that safe passage within the area may not be possible.19
Figure 3 is a graphical depiction of the concept of layered minefields. Ideally,
the minefield would be planned to meet the desired level of damage and threat
to a target. The minefields then would be layered to meet the desired operational
objective.
PLANNING TO ACHIEVE AN OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
Mine groups should be layered within the mine segment to build an appropriate
level of threat within an area of the minefield. The two concepts that apply are
the density of the mine group and the number of mine groups needed within a
minefield to achieve the disrupt, fix, turn, and block functions. The psychological condition of the enemy and its willingness to accept risk will determine the
number of minefields and the density required to meet the commander’s intent.
The enemy’s exact psychological status may not be known until the war is over;
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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however, trends, status reports, and military judgment can provide enough information to deploy an initial minefield, one that later can be reshaped or reseeded
to strengthen it. A single sparse minefield might be sufficient to achieve the
disrupt and fix effects, whereas robust minefields may be needed for successful
turn or block functions. The number of possible targets in the area will impact the
number of rows of mine groups or minefields needed to achieve the desired effect. Figure 4 shows a notional guidance to communicate concepts of application.
Although there are exceptions, disrupt-type fields typically will be constructed
from mine groups consisting of fewer mines than would other types. Such minefields will have fewer mine rows. A notional example is a minefield made up of
two rows of mine groups, with each mine group presenting a threat level of x.
Even though a disrupt field should require fewer mines, since it is not designed
to blockade a port, an enemy may choose not to challenge the field, effectively
making the disrupt field a block field.
Fix fields should have mine groups that provide a somewhat higher threat level
than disrupt fields, to extend the delay time for strike missions by increasing the
risk of mine-to-target interactions or to complicate enemy MCM efforts further.
Yet fix fields will have the same, or a similar, number of rows of mine groups
within a minefield. A notional example is a minefield made up of two rows of
mine groups, with each mine group providing a threat level of y, where y > x, with
x being the threat of a disrupt field.
Turn fields should have mine groups providing a significant threat and a large
number of rows of mine groups. This increase in threat, along with the depth
of the field, should represent enough risk to the enemy that it would rather run
the risk of what awaits its ships through the turn than risk a continual transit
through a field it cannot counter, owing to limitations in time or technology. A
notional example is a minefield consisting of six rows of mine groups, with each
mine group having a threat of z, where z > y, with y being the threat of a fix field.
Block fields should have mine groups providing a significant threat and a large
number of rows, as well as some additional mines seeded to account for enemy
persistence. The goal is to make transit through the minefield so perilous that an
enemy refuses to challenge the field. However, complete and long-term blocks
may be nearly impossible to achieve, depending on what attrition rates the enemy will accept. A notional example is a minefield consisting of six rows of mine
groups, with each mine group having a threat of z + k, where z is the threat of a
turn field and k represents the additional mines added to the minefield.
Figure 4 is merely illustrative; the mine groups might be consistent or inconsistent in their placement on the basis of length. A minefield planner will exercise knowledge and creativity to determine where the individual mines should
be placed. The figure provides an example useful for introducing concepts for
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/5
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discussion. However, its primary purpose is to clarify terms, not to limit mining
to ports; the same paradigm can be applied across maritime mining concepts.
PAIRING OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES WITH
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
It is critical to pair operational objectives with appropriate MOEs. While simple
initial threat is a good MOE to use for disrupt, and possibly fix, fields, it is a poor
measure for establishing how many mines are required to block a determined
adversary, because it does not take into account mine attrition resulting from
strikes and MCM activity. Instead, penetrator distribution and expected casualties (described below) would be suitable MOEs for the block function. Commanders must be able to articulate their intentions via pairing an operational
objective with an MOE, such that clear communication occurs throughout the
chain of command.
New MOEs also are needed—MOEs that fit with operational objectives. Otherwise, we end up forcing an MOE into an operational objective because it is
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merely the best fit from within the current list of MOEs. Condensed definitions
of MOEs and suggestions for pairing current MOEs with operational objectives
are given below; however, current MOEs were not designed specifically to meet
the operational objectives discussed.
It is also necessary to note that casualties are not always the best criterion for
analyzing minefield success. For example, assume that in areas A and B a planner needs to achieve a turn, and uses cumulative casualty distribution to plan the
minefields. In area A, the enemy chooses not to challenge the minefield and turns
accordingly—thus, the minefield does not cause a single casualty—whereas in
area B, the enemy chooses to challenge the minefield and loses three ships, but
does not turn and is able to move forward. Considering the loss of enemy ships,
one might conclude that area B was more effective; however, area A actually was
more successful at supporting the strategic objectives for the conflict. This line
of analysis demonstrates that new MOEs must be developed not only to match
the intent of the commander’s operational objective correctly but also to broach
a discussion about new MOEs for future mining capabilities. Table 1 provides
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTORS OF CURRENT MOEs
MOE

Descriptor

Time

Two measures of time:
(1) 	the effective life of the minefield
(2) 	the time required to execute the specified mining mission

Risk

The threat level of the minefield to enemy transitors and the risk
to friendly transitors (active mines that lack remote command and
control are a risk to both enemy and friendly forces)

Initial threat

The probability that the first vessel to attempt transiting through the
minefield will become a casualty

Casualty density distribution

The probability that exactly k casualties will occur in n transit attempts through the minefield

Threat profile

The minefield threat to each successive transitor in a sequence of n
transit attempts through the minefield

Expected casualties

The average number of casualties, k, in a given number of transits,
n, through a minefield that would occur in a large number of repetitions of n transit attempts under statistically equivalent conditions

Cumulative casualty distribution

The probability of at least k casualties out of n transits through the
minefield

Sustained threat

The measure of a minefield’s ability to resist the effects of enemy
mine countermeasures and provide a continued threat following passage of the first enemy transitors

Penetrator distribution

The probability of exactly j penetrators (targets that safely transit the
minefield) in n transit attempts through the minefield
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TABLE 2
RECOMMENDED PAIRINGS USING CURRENT MOEs
Operational Objective

Applicable MOEs
(time and sustained threat are implied considerations throughout)

Disrupt

Initial threat

Fix

Initial threat
Low levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, penetrator
distribution

Turn

High levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, penetrator
distribution

Block

Highest levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution,
penetrator distribution

descriptors of current MOEs; table 2 provides recommendations for matching
them to objectives.
The methodology used pairs the operational objective with the current MOE
that best suits the intent of the operational objective. For example, if the intent is
to disrupt an enemy, the best MOEs to use may be time and initial threat, because
of the relative amount of investment required to achieve the desired effects. If
the intent is to cause an enemy to delay the departure of his assets and force him
to conduct MCM, merely causing him to perceive some threat may delay the
departure of ships and bring on MCM operations. This may be achieved via an
initial threat versus a penetrator distribution, which might obviate the need for a
massive investment, depending on the choices made for the j penetrators out of
n transitors.
WHY IT MATTERS
The mine warfare community is small; it lacks the exposure and training afforded
to many other warfare areas. This has decayed the understanding and valuation
of the U.S. Navy’s mining capability, which then compounds the exposure and
training deficits. This result further complicates matters through a loss of appreciation for the painstaking process that minefield planners must complete to
continue to provide sound plans.
Having clear operational objectives and their associated MOEs linked together
will provide decision makers with the information necessary to match each MOE
to its desired effect. The question of what simple initial threat is needed to blockade a port is a difficult one even in a specific context, especially when even the
threat of a minefield may blockade a port. However, until we fully understand
the psychology of our adversary—a daunting proposition—it is clear that we
must look at more-appropriate MOEs to achieve a blockade. Effective mining is
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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achieved through clear operational objectives, MOEs, training, planning tools,
and effective delivery. Tools and training should be developed to optimize what
can be delivered, considering the dynamics of conflict.
THE MINES OF TOMORROW
During a November 2015 Mine Warfare Association event, Expeditionary Warfare (OPNAV N95) discussed several efforts to advance the capabilities of maritime mining. The current mine inventory is seeing new algorithms and increased
capabilities. Some of the mines of tomorrow will be delivered from unmanned
underwater vehicles equipped with large-diameter tubes. Technological initiatives are striving to create precision mining with standoff for air-delivery platforms; other efforts include remote-control capability and wide-area coverage.20
Open-source literature gives us a glimpse of possibilities, starting with the next
iteration of air-delivered mines.
Precision air-delivered mines for use at standoff ranges are being created
from mine components that are already in the U.S. inventory. Efforts to provide
mines with the same splash-point accuracy of a Joint Direct Attack Munition
are under way through Quickstrike-J. To expand further the capability of precision air-delivered mines, efforts to extend ranges also are moving forward with
Quickstrike-ER. Success will allow a B-52H to lay an entire minefield in one
pass, without having to fly over the minefield, while achieving mine-placement
accuracies within six meters of aim points on the seabed.21
Smart mining will provide commanders with wide-area-coverage minefields,
positive control of the minefield, and the ability to engage multiple targets that use
the same transit path. Unlike traditional minefields, a single weapon-to-target interaction does not cause a hole in the minefield (assuming that there is more than
a single weapon); thus, a persistent threat to traffic will remain despite adversary
efforts to channelize traffic to minimize traditional mine engagements.
McGeehan and Wahl call for the use of underwater gliders to carry guidance
and trigger systems and explosives—effectively, to convert them into smart
mines. Their concept calls for using “flash mob” tactics: mobile mines converging on shipping lanes and choke points, or simply creating a barrier. These mines
would be able to avoid mine countermeasures while waiting for instructions. Furthermore, such a concept would allow friendly units to pass through safely, with
the barrier reestablished behind them. New effects also are being introduced to
detain ships by fouling props and rudders, or disabling them by other nonkinetic
means. Using nonlethal mines would allow the neutralization rather than the
sinking of targets—to enforce an embargo, for instance.22
The United States is not the only country interested in using mining to reduce the capabilities of potential adversaries. According to GlobalSecurity.org,
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Iran can produce nonmagnetic, free-floating, and remote-controlled mines.23
Furthermore, it also may have acquired mines from Russia and negotiated for
rocket-propelled rising mines from China. In another example, Goldstein provides evidence that China views maritime mining as an important component
of naval warfare.24 Its concepts for mine delivery include air, surface, and subsurface platforms that can deliver mines so as to provide challenges in both ports
and open water. Mining is such a key component for China that fishing vessels
may be called on to “block foreign enemy intervention.” To counter our surveillance, MCM, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, China also is looking at
emerging technology to target aircraft, using mines that launch missiles. Truver
further describes China’s mining capability, mentioning that the country has
more than thirty types of mines, including remote-controlled, rocket-propelled,
and mobile varieties.25 Several other countries’ capabilities in maritime mining
are progressing, and it would be a mistake to think they are looking only at traditional measures.
MINEFIELD PLANNING CAPABILITIES
Pietrucha points out that advances in mining technology are outpacing the capacity of planners to design minefields properly. As new maritime mining capabilities are added, the tools and concepts of mine warfare should evolve to maximize
the effectiveness of the new maritime mines.26 This is particularly important with
regard to the emerging capabilities of the Clandestine Delivered Mine System (in
which unmanned vehicles deliver mines) and the new Quickstrike-J/ER mine
(which will be in service shortly), followed by other advanced mining concepts.
Initial threat is determined with regard to the minefield as it exists before an
enemy attempts to challenge the minefield. After the initial target-to-weapon
engagement (particularly in cases involving explode-in-place mines) the threat
level is changed, because the minefield itself is no longer the same. A new analysis would be needed to determine the threat that the remaining mines represent.
In some cases, planners and operational leaders themselves—especially those
unfamiliar with mining—may not understand the reduction in the threat that
the revised field poses, and may assume that the initial threat is sustained for
each target. Such an interpretation might lead to operational or tactical miscalculation, perhaps with catastrophic results. On the other hand, mining concepts
based on weaponized distributive sensor nodes may mean that the threat will be
consistent for each target until weapon depletion, assuming the field is planned
to engage each target.
Minefield planning capabilities and language must be created to enable planning for and communicating about future minefields, especially those involving precision placement. For instance, planners should be able to convey plans
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readily for various traffic patterns. This is particularly important for fields in
choke points (for cumulative casualty–type measures) and open-water fields (in
which targets might advance in a spread formation, enabling the minefield to interact with multiple targets at once). It is possible simply to add terms to current
and future minefield plans to differentiate the assumptions. Examples include
channelized cumulative casualty distribution and random cumulative casualty distribution, where channelized and random are meant to clarify assumptions about
the targets’ behavior through the minefield (channelized: targets enter the field in
a line; random: targets enter the field at random locations). Effective language is
needed to communicate the specifics of fields that soon may be constructed using a greatly expanded list of effectors, and this language should be incorporated
into the planning tool.
MINING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS EXPANSION
While operational objectives are critical to any strategy, it is important for mine
planners and commanders to have something against which to measure their
fields. While the MOEs now in place measure current capabilities adequately,
emerging mining capabilities will require new MOEs to assess their effects. In the
discussion below I identify concepts for MOE expansion to meet the upgraded
capabilities of today’s mines, as well as those of tomorrow.
The first is continuous threat.27 The premise is to plan fields for a threat level
for n number of targets, given k number of effectors. (For now, explosive effectors that engage one target will be the focus, but the Navy also is assessing various
other effectors, both kinetic and nonkinetic.) Essentially, continuous threat means
being able to maintain simple initial threat for a determined number of follow-on
targets. For example, the simple initial threat may be x for the first targets, then
be lowered to y for the next, while continuous threat maintains the threat of x
for various targets. Planners would be able to incorporate effectively targeting
optimization, counters, probability of fire, delay arm, and other capabilities early
on in the planning process to determine the resources required to create the ordered field. Furthermore, with the ability in the near future to practice precision
placement of mines and to combine that with some degree of positive control of
the minefield, the command and control authority should be able to check the
“health” of the field and maintain it by reseeding mines or reshaping the field.
This should permit the authority to limit the number of sorties required to ensure
that the field maintains its designed threat level right up until the field can no
longer achieve the intended threat level or is depleted of effectors. While a number of factors dictate the threat the field represents, the premise is to maintain
the threat against multiple targets, regardless of what formation or channelization they choose. This MOE is particularly relevant to weaponized distributive
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maintaining threat, e.g. all weapons are expended

sensor–type mining systems. Continuous threat is one of the small number of
MOEs that should fit under any of the operational objectives.
A natural extension from the continuous threat MOE is the threat over time
MOE. The concept is that commanders would be able to implement threat to n
targets per day (or some other time measure—e.g., hours) for a desired duration.
The idea is to optimize systems so as to vary threat level t for n out of k targets
per day over some duration of time. This MOE may be used to highlight specific times of interest, such as high tide; reduce threat during low tide; or simply
exercise a variable threat throughout the time. Planners can employ this MOE
with creativity to achieve their objectives. The threat over time MOE lends itself
to forecasting reseeding requirements, which would assist with asset and supply
planning, as well as providing considerations for repositioning planning (shoot
and relocate, shoot and withdraw) for self-relocating effectors and effector/
vehicle minefields or applications of remote command and control with explodein-place mines. This MOE would fall under the disrupt and fix operational
objectives.
Extensions of the current time MOE might capture estimated time of operational effect. Extension becomes necessary when, for instance, a minefield is still
active even though it no longer can achieve its original intended objective. The
MOE would be based on mixed-method analysis from known capabilities and
military judgment, refined as information and intent change throughout the
conflict. This MOE inherently suffers from numerous sources for error; however, it also has the potential to provide an answer concerning time. For example,
consider the commander’s operational objective of blockade, intended to close
a port. While the ability to execute a mining mission is critical, the importance
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of time
the field will be able operationally to support the strategic objectives of the
fleet. Providing this answer requires combining multiple variables into a “best
estimate.” Answering the commander’s important question—“How long?”—will
require a range of subject-matter experts to assist the planner in assigning values
to these variables. The first variable is the initial threat of the field needed (with
counter-countermeasures already defined) to cause the enemy to perceive threat
in the port. The second variable is the enemy’s acceptable attrition rate—that is,
what level of casualties he is willing to accept to challenge the field (including
with hardened vessels or those that choose to disregard the risk) before conducting professional MCM. Essentially, this variable captures what attrition the
enemy considers acceptable in attempting to open a channel via brute-force port
breakout.
The next variable considers enemy MCM. To calculate its value, intelligence
officers will determine how important the port is relative to other ports, the enemy’s order of battle for clearing fields, where those credible enemy MCM assets
are located, and how long it will take for them to transit to the port of interest.
Assigning a value to this variable will require assistance from MCM experts and
intelligence officers. MCM experts will use software tools (such as the Naval
Mine Warfare Simulation) to determine how long it will take to clear a channel
through the field. Intelligence officers will estimate the enemy’s level of acceptable risk, as well as an MCM skill multiplier that compares the enemy’s abilities
with our own, based on trends and other sources of information. Once these
values are determined, the planner can create a minefield calculated to provide
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an estimated time of operational effect. Like continuous threat, this MOE will fit
under any of the operational objectives.
The final MOE offered is scalable traffic. While this MOE can have direct
military application, it mainly is intended to support political and economic
impacts. Ideally, this MOE would be associated with a mine that is highly reliable
and has an efficient discrimination capability. Examples of military applications
include forcing the enemy to change his replenishment behavior and reducing
traffic in an area to increase the probability that a given vessel in the minefield is a
desired target. Achieving a political/economic impact would require knowing, or
estimating with some appropriate level of confidence, what level of threat would
be needed to deter noncombatants from entering an area of interest. This MOE
would require initial research efforts to provide an estimate of likely courses of
action from military, commercial, and private vessels that commonly operate
within an area of interest. This MOE would allow commanders to employ the
minimum number of mines required to change the traffic of vessels in specific
categories.
However, planners’ capacity to map with this ability in mind requires conducting research and considering trends amid circumstances that may be in flux. For
example, assume that the objective is to stop a particular shipping company from
delivering particular items to a port. Investigation has indicated that the company
FIGURE 7
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is not highly motivated to risk damage—entering a minefield would cancel its
insurance policy. This consideration disrupts the delivery timetable. However,
some companies or state-sponsored ships might be willing to challenge the field,
owing to a monetary or other kind of inducement promised for undertaking the
challenge. The research should attempt to determine how much risk or attrition
would be sufficient to convince all comers that the risk is not worth the reward.
While one minefield may turn away ships in one group, an increased threat or
level of attrition might be required to turn away those in another group. Furthermore, knowing how traffic should react provides planners with a starting point
for selecting mine counter-countermeasures and provides some indication of the
probability that the vessels within the minefield are targets of interest. Reducing
the density of nontargets within an area lowers the likelihood that unintended
targets will be tracked or hit, and provides warfighters with a clearer picture of
the battle space. The concept even might be applied in the form of announcing
a fictitious or phony minefield in an effort to reduce traffic so as to provide submarines a clearer area of operation. This concept also can be applied to the goal
of diverting traffic. Scalable traffic could fit under the operational objectives of
disrupt and turn.
Current mining paradigms and shape concepts must be improved to prepare for
the mining of the future. Doing so will require creating categories of operational
objectives to assist commanders and planners in clarifying intent. The ability to
plan for various effects on a target (e.g., mobility kill, particularly when nonlethal
mines are operational) will allow planners to recommend options that could
achieve the intent while possibly reducing the number of mines required to complete a mission. Such a reduction in mines likely would reduce costs, in terms
of both risk and inventory. Linking operational objectives to MOEs will provide
warfighters with a clear understanding of what type of effort must be carried out
to realize the commander’s intent. Investing in new minefield planning capabilities and MOEs will enable the fleet to capitalize now on emerging capabilities
even as they prepare for mid- and long-term capabilities. It is critical that the
concepts, language, support, and tools for the mines of tomorrow keep pace with
the development of those mines.
Table 3 shows what tomorrow’s MOE pairings may look like.
Commanders and planners would be able to discuss varying levels of threat
to the target and would have a clear starting point for discussing objectives and
measures. Neal Kusumoto has written: “The real success of mining is often
indirect and usually difficult to measure. The operational artist is faced with
the choice of either building an MOE with his situation’s strategic and operational objectives clearly in mind, choosing one of the existing MOEs knowing its
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TABLE 3
POSSIBLE PAIRINGS USING FUTURE MOEs
Operational Objective

Applicable MOEs
(estimated time of operational effect, time, and sustained threat
are implied considerations throughout)

Disrupt

Initial threat, continuous threat, threat over time, scalable traffic

Fix

Initial threat
Low levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution,
penetrator distribution, continuous threat, threat over time

Turn

High levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution,
penetrator distribution, continuous threat, scalable traffic

Block

Highest levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution,
penetrator distribution, continuous threat

limitations, or assuming a certain level of effect.”28 While the MOEs suggested in
this article certainly do not encompass all those needed, a conversation should
begin now regarding investment of the time necessary to update doctrine. This
may relieve the pressure on some future planner attempting to match intent with
MOEs during a conflict, allowing him or her to focus on the actual plan instead.

NOTES

1.	Gregory K. Hartmann, with Scott C. Truver,
Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S.
Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1991).
2.	William L. Greer and James C. Bartholomew
[Cdr., USN], Psychological Aspects of Mine
Warfare, Professional Paper 365 (Alexandria,
VA: Center for Naval Analyses, October
1982), available at www.cna.org/.
3.	Sabrina R. Edlow, U.S. Employment of Naval
Mines: A Chronology, Document CIM 506
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses,
1997), available at www.cna.org/.
4.	
Spencer C. Tucker and Priscilla M. Roberts,
Encyclopedia of World War I: A Political, Social, and Military History, s.v. “Milner, Alfred,
Viscount.”
5.	Steve L. Wilson [Maj., USMC], “The Naval
Assault on Gallipoli: Going for Broke, or Just
Broken?” (master’s thesis, U.S. Marine Corps

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Summer2019Review.indb 60

Command and Staff College, 2002), available
at www.dtic.mil/.
6.	Hartmann, Weapons That Wait.
7.	“Mines and Mine Laying in Iceland WWII,”
LHG [Icelandic Coast Guard] (2005), www
.lhg.is/.
8.	John S. Chilstrom [Maj., USAF], “Mines
Away! The Significance of U.S. Army Air
Forces Minelaying in World War II” (thesis,
USAF Air University School of Advanced
Airpower Studies, 1992), pp. 25, 35, available
at www.dtic.mil/.
9.	
“World War II Harbor Defenses,” National
Park Service, 2015, www.nps.gov/.
10. William L. Greer, The 1972 Mining of
Haiphong Harbor: A Case Study in Naval Mining and Diplomacy, IDA Document D-2056
(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1997), pp. 5–7, available at www.dtic.mil/.

21

5/2/19 11:35 AM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 3, Art. 5

11. Wayne P. Hughes [Capt., USN (Ret.)], “Naval
Operations: A Close Look at the Operational
Level of War at Sea,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012), p. 25. Emphasis in original.
12. U.S. Defense Dept., Barriers, Obstacles, and
Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, JP 3-15
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016),
available at www.jcs.mil/.
13. U.S. Navy Dept., Engineering Operations,
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-17
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, February 2000), available at www
.marines.mil/.
14. U.S. Defense Dept., Barriers, Obstacles, and
Mine Warfare.
15. Chilstrom, “Mines Away!,” p. 27.
16. Ibid., p. 17.
17. Tucker and Roberts, Encyclopedia of World
War I, s.v. “Milner, Alfred, Viscount.”
18. Greer, The 1972 Mining of Haiphong Harbor,
pp. 8, 10.
19. Chatham House, “International Law Applicable to Naval Mines,” International Security
Department Workshop Summary (report,
International Security Department, London, October 2014), available at www
.chathamhouse.org/.
20. R. S. Walsh and G. Allen, “OPNAV N95
Update,” in Proceedings of the Biennial

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/5

NWC_Summer2019Review.indb 61

E D WA R D S

61

International Mine Warfare Technology Symposium (2015).
21. Michael W. Pietrucha [Col., USAF], “Navy,
Air Force Reviving Offensive Mining with
New Quickstrikes,” USNI News, April 26,
2016, news.usni.org/.
22. Timothy McGeehan [Cdr., USN (Ret.)] and
Douglas Wahl [Cdr., USN (Ret.)], “Flash Mob
in the Shipping Lane!,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 142/1/1,355 (January 2016).
23. “Islamic Republic of Iran IRIN Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy,”
GlobalSecurity.org.
24. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Old-School Killers: Fear
China’s Sea Mines,” National Interest, October
14, 2015, nationalinterest.org/.
25. Scott C. Truver, “Taking Mines Seriously:
Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas,” Naval
War College Review 65, no. 2 (Spring 2012),
pp. 30–66.
26. Pietrucha, “Navy, Air Force Reviving Offensive Mining.”
27. This concept was inspired by the work of Victor Newton of Booz Allen Hamilton.
28. Neal J. Kusumoto [Lt. Cdr., USN], “The Lost
Art of Maritime Mining” (course paper, U.S.
Naval War College Department of Operations, November 1995), available at www.dtic
.mil/.

22

5/2/19 11:35 AM

